John Evans served as U.S. Ambassador to Armenia from 2004 to 2006. The interview was conducted by Mher D. Sahakyan, a Fulbright Visiting Scholar (2024-2025) at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, in Washington, D.C., on May 14, 2025. 

Mher D. Sahakyan

In The Truth Held Hostage America and the Armenian Genocide – What Then? What Now? Book, you outlined, that the US policy in the South Caucasus were based on three pillars: stability, building the economy, and strengthening democratic institutions. Which factors frame this geostrategy during your ambassadorial term?

John Evans

U.S. policy toward the three newly independent states of the South Caucasus was consistent with its   overall policy toward the former USSR. The U.S. sought stability and economic growth because the first effect of the Soviet economy’s collapse was mass impoverishment. The U.S. believed that building the economy and fostering democratic institutions would be the best approach, particularly for a country like Armenia. First, the Americans believed that democratic institutions were not only better for the people, but also tended to attract investors. If a country has stable institutions, the rule of law, and a good court system, it will be a plus for investors. As for strengthening democratic institutions, the U.S. did as much as it could during the Bush administration. For instance, the U.S. provided advisors to the Armenian parliament and court system because, initially, these institutions did not have many highly qualified staff. The Armenian-American Bar Association also did its part. The perception was that when a competent and efficient Armenian-American organization wanted to work in Armenia, the American side was all for it as long as they were providing results. There was an agricultural group in Fresno (the Armenian Technology Group or ATG) that collaborated with the Department of Agriculture to help Armenian farmers. For instance, they helped the grape-growers, cattle and fish farmers to develop their businesses. The Millennium Challenge Account, which was set up during the term of President Bush, provided a major grant for a project designed by Armenians. The purpose of the project was to repair the Soviet-era irrigation system, then in terrible condition, and to fix roads that would connect small farming communities to towns where farmers could reach  markets and sell their products.  Unfortunately, the project came with some conditions and had to be terminated short of reaching its fullest potential.

Currently, the situation is different, as President Trump is not very interested in strengthening democratic institutions, and his administration has effectively dismantled USAID.

Mher D. Sahakyan

In your book, you have spoken about the Armenian Genocide, mentioning that it was your own opinion in 2005, and President Biden recognised it as a Genocide only in 2021. What kind of feelings did you have that day? What do you think which kind of impact did it have on the US-Armenia relations? What was the main aim of President Biden to call it a genocide, and what kind of effect will the fact that President Trump did not call it a genocide have?

John Evans

I became involved in the question of Genocide recognition in my ambassadorial term, although I had had no intention of prioritizing the issue. I never talked about the U.S. policy of non-recognition in Armenia, but when I was invited to visit centers of Armenian population in New York, Boston, Los Angeles and San Francisco, I allowed that, in my personal view, there had indeed been a genocide in 1915, but that this was not the official policy of the United States.   I explained that the main reason why the US government refrained from using the word was that Turkey was a NATO ally. Turkey insists that there was no genocide, and Ankara becomes very upset when other countries and other people use the word. President Biden, as a senator, had been in favor of recognition for a very long time, and used the term in his proclamation of April 24, 2021. However, in the statement, it is mentioned as an “Ottoman-era genocide”, as if to stress how long ago it was and how it was in a different system compared with today’s Turkey (even if the Genocide was not ordered, so far as we know, by the Sultan). I was glad that Biden used the word, but I was disappointed that on almost the same day, my administration renewed the waiver of section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which limited arms deliveries to Azerbaijan.  The waiver had enabled the administration to send arms to Azerbaijan after 9/11.  In my view, the Genocide ought to have been recognized and the waiver rescinded simultaneously. As for the impact on U.S.-Armenian relations, there were people both in Armenia and in the United States who welcomed President Biden’s move, but the basic relationship did not change very much. President Trump’s proclamation in 2025 was apparently written by the bureaucracy. The authors seem to have dropped the word, perhaps because Biden had used it, and perhaps because of the Erdogan factor, as President Trump considers himself to be good friends with the Turkish president. The fact is that two U.S. presidents, Reagan and Biden, not to mention the U.S. Congress, have already recognized the Armenian Genocide.

Mher D. Sahakyan

Will the promotion of democracy continue to play a role in bilateral relations between the US and Armenia during the presidency of Mr. Trump, as it did during the presidency of Mr. Biden, even if it was a geopolitical tool?

John Evans

The U.S. is unlikely to prioritize promoting democracy in the South Caucasus during President Trump’s administration, as he and his team seem to be mainly interested in business. Nevertheless, Americans really do believe in democracy. Although some observers believe that backing Ukraine in the conflict with Russia was using “democratic values” as a geopolitical tool to some extent, the deeper reasons Biden supported Ukraine had more to do with not wanting to let it be totally overpowered by Russia. Now that game is still on, and it is not clear where it will come out tomorrow.  (This was the day before the Istanbul talks were supposed to take place).

Mher D. Sahakyan

Why did the US sign a Strategic Partnership Charter with Armenia? What were the main motivations and interests of the US, and what can both sides get from it in reality? Will the establishment of this strategic partnership between Armenia and the US be enough to deter Azerbaijan and Turkey from starting a new war against Armenia?

John Evans

By establishing a strategic partnership with Armenia, the U.S. was signaling to Armenia and to the region that the United States viewed Armenia as a serious partner. One of the reasons may also have been to toss a lifeline to Armenia, even though the strategic partnership charter does not have a military component (although the sides are now considering more military cooperation). It is not like NATO’s Article V, but it is a signal to Azerbaijan and Turkey that the US cares about Armenia. President Trump is hardly involved in this strategic partnership. Therefore, this American-Armenian strategic partnership will mainly be carried out, if at all, by the national security bureaucracy. If the bureaucracy is relatively stable, things will get done. Meetings between high-level officials will take place in each other’s capitals and can bring new opportunities for cooperation. The U.S. is already working behind the scenes for peacebuilding between Armenia and Azerbaijan, talking to the Azerbaijanis and trying to make sure they do not commit a terrible error. The United States is generally supportive of Pashinyan. It advocates a peace treaty, which, of course, has turned out to be very difficult for understandable reasons, but it is hard to imagine that Washington will be more involved than it was in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group.  It is difficult to predict what is going to happen in that part of the world. The fact is that Iran is back in the news in a different way now: there may be either peace or war.

Mher D. Sahakyan

As an American diplomat you also worked in Iran, and you know what has happened between the US and Iran and the current situation. Recently, Armenia and Iran implemented military drills on both sides of the Araks River. What do you think will impact relations between the US and Armenia?

John Evans

It is my theory that when relations between the United States and Russia or the United States and Iran are bad, Armenia suffers as a result of unintended consequences. The issue is usually that of sanctions.  Armenia is in the middle, and it does significant trade with both Russia and Iran.  I am hoping for an improvement in his country’s relations with Russia and Iran, as well as with Armenia.

Mher D. Sahakyan

What do you think about the current developments in Armenian Turkish and Armenian Russian Relations?

John Evans

It is good that Armenia is trying to solve its historical problems with Turkey, but it still needs to maintain its relations with Russia. Moscow is still the closest capable power centre. It is to the advantage of Armenia not to cut all ties with Russia, as Armenians have so much business there, as well as a history. Turkey will not be a reliable partner for Armenia for a long time; however, NATO, to a certain degree, restrains Turkey’s imperialistic tendencies  (though Ankara has recently pursued a more independent foreign policy).

Mher D. Sahakyan

How can Armenia generate interest for the US, considering Armenia’s geographically far location from the US? What can it propose to President Trump’s administration?

John Evans

I suggest that  there is a need to strengthen people-to-people contacts.  Tourism can play an important role. A lot does depend on the historical Armenian diaspora, which, of course, is mainly in California, but ever since the 1988 earthquake, ordinary Americans mostly figured out where Armenia is.  Americans generally have a positive image of Armenia, as the first Christian nation, with beautiful landscapes and tasty products. There have been quite a few congressional visitors and there is ongoing cooperation with Kansas. It will also be a good idea to invite American journalists to Armenia to inform Americans about the country. Sides can also think about cooperation in high-tech development. Since the time zones are exactly opposite as between California and Yerevan, they can work on something in Silicon Valley and then send it overnight to Armenia, where Armenians can continue the work and send it back.

Mher D. Sahakyan

In your book, you positively mention the work of the USAID in Armenia. President Trump decided to terminate the work of USAID. What do you think the kind of impact it will have on the US soft power capabilities in these countries? Will it bring more opportunities to Russia and China to advance their soft power diplomacy?

John Evans

I believe it was a mistake to shut down USAID.  This decision will leave the way open for Russia and China in the South Caucasus.  USAID was very active in Armenia, having multiple programs, with its own building in the U.S. Embassy compound.

Mher D. Sahakyan

What do you think was the main mistake of Armenian diplomacy? That at the end of the day, Armenia has got the worst possible result for Nagorno-Karabakh, and even after that, the territorial integrity of the country is still under question.

John Evans

Although I am hesitant to criticize the Armenian Government, I allowe that, during the terms of Serzh Sargsyan and Nikol Pashinyan, the Armenian military failed to carry out needed reforms and to modernize. Another problem was political: was it wise of the Prime Minister to announce in Stepanakert that “Artsakh is Armenia.  Period”?  It also seemed to me that during the final peace talks in November 2020, professional diplomats were excluded from the negotiations, which appeared to be carried out by a very small circle. It was clear before the war that trouble was coming, but the Armenian government did not seem to take it seriously.  Even in a democracy, attention has to be paid not only to social issues and building democratic institutions, but also to national security.  If that means getting drones from China, Iran or any other places, so be it. It was depressing in the 2020 war to see that the Azerbaijanis were using high-tech drones, while Armenia was fighting as if it were World War I in the trenches. It is also unclear why the Armenian side did not try to keep Kalbajar and Lachin, giving back only the other five regions. Now there are problems, particularly the Azeris claiming the so-called Zangezur Corridor.  If the sides can solve this question in such a way that goods travel across Armenian territory on Armenian roads and go through Armenian customs, even uninspected, that is fine, but if a “corridor” has extra- territorial international status like the Danzig Corridor, it will bring problems for Armenia.

Mher D. Sahakyan

What was the US position during the 2020 war as a co-chair of the Minsk Group?

John Evans

The US was also heavily involved in the OSCE Minsk Group process for mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. During the first presidential term of Donald Trump, there was a change.  For instance, the U.S. co-chair was not accorded the rank of ambassador. This was not simply a diplomatic protocol issue; it was indicative of a deemphasis on the OSCE in general and on the Minsk Group in particular, and it also entailed a certain lack of attention from the 7th floor (the top of the State Department) to that issue. I do not believe that the U.S. mediator had as easy access to the top levels of the State Department as his predecessors had before. This was not good for the process, which broke down even before the 2020 war and is now essentially non-functional.

Mher D. Sahakyan, Ambassador John Evans, Ambassador Michael C. Lemmon, and Mr. Artin DerSimonian